I didn’t intend to say anything, but since the discussion

has been opened up, I will make a couple of observations, Mr.

Chairman.

At no time would we need bipartisan foreign policy more than we

do now, and I am one of those who profoundly regrets that bipartisanship

seems to be a rare exception these days and strident voices

of partisanship are heard in the land.

I agree with my good friend from Iowa that our relations with

Russia and our relations with China are certainly far more important

than our relations with Yugoslavia, and I also think it is important

to look beyond the daily irrational actions of Mr. Yeltsin

and to ask what happened to U.S./Russian relations since the collapse

of the Soviet Union.

Some of us visited the Soviet Union for many years, and then

Russia, and after the breakup of the Soviet Union, there was an

enormous amount of goodwill toward the United States. We had a

leadership delegation that visited Russia just a week or two after

the first summit between Mr. Clinton and Mr. Yeltsin in the spring

of 1993, and the reception on the Russian side could not have been

more enthusiastic, cordial and hopeful, maybe overly hopeful.

The following year we had another leadership delegation to Moscow.

The reception was somewhat less ebullient. The third year it

was not ebullient at all, and the reason, of course, is clear.

We had two examples before us in this century on how to deal

with defeated powers. After the First World War, we acted in a

narrow, myopic, non generous fashion, and we reaped Hitler in the

Second World War.

After the Second World War, with the Marshall Plan, we acted

in a singularly generous, farsighted, intelligent fashion, and we

reaped two generations of peace.

When the Third World war ended which, of course, was the end

of the Cold War with the defeat of the Soviet Union and the triumph

of the democracies, we had these two examples, and we did

not choose the intelligent second example.

The Russians had tremendous expectations of cooperation and

assistance and help and participation. Yeltsin and his foreign minister

were so pro-American that it was almost embarrassing to see

them publicly express their love affair with us, but with the exception

of Nunn-Lugar funds, there is very little we did.

Now, I understand corruption in Russia probably as well as anybody

here, and I am not suggesting we should have pumped money

into Russia, but we should have provided project aid. We should

have provided specific assistance to groups. The much maligned

George Soros recommended that $4 a month would have provided

adequate retirement for Russian seniors, which would have been a

pittance. He proposed that in a *Wall Street Journal* article that I

still have in my office, one of the most intelligent suggestions of the

post-Soviet era never acted upon.

I think it is not surprising that a country which was one of the

two superpowers, which was looked up to from the Olympics to

military might across the globe, feels unbelievably frustrated, and

given the very second-quality, second-rate leadership, stumbles

from crisis to crisis.

The China case, Mr. Chairman, is a bit different because I think

in a sense what is happening is China is very salutary for those

in this country—I don’t include myself—who have been very naive

about China. China is showing its true colors as a Communist dictatorship.

The Chinese leadership knows every bit as well as every Member

of this Committee that the bombing of the embassy was by mistake,

that the President and the Secretary of State and the Secretary

of Defense and everybody else apologized. We stand ready

to make financial restitution to the families of the victims, and we

stand ready to bear the cost of rebuilding the embassy once the

time comes.

But what the Chinese Communist leadership has done was to revert

back to the most sickening characteristics of a Communist police

state, lying through its teeth to its people and whipping up

anti-Western sentiment. This is not a new phenomenon in China.

It goes back to the Boxer Rebellion and way beyond, but I think

it is important for us to sort of get our bearings straight and not

engage in internecine warfare here, but to take a prospective look

at our relations with both China and Russia and try to make the

most of the singularly unstable and somewhat chaotic relationship

and to awaken from our dream of viewing China as a great democratically

moving ally; it is anything but that.

China has shown its true colors in the last few days, and that

lesson had to be learned by some of our policy makers, both in and

out of government.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As we look at Russia today, what we see, it seems to me, Mr.

Ambassador, is an economic basket case and a nuclear superpower

with a deeply wounded national psyche, and that is a rather dangerous

and volatile combination.

Now, in planning policy for the post-Yeltsin era, it seems to me

we need to be conscious of the enormous positive developments that

have unfolded in Russia in the last decade. They have a free press.

They travel freely. They have access to Western media. Practically

all of the Russian leadership has recognized the enormous importance

of economic cooperation with the West. Even General Lebed

is making statements which indicate that he is beginning to understand

that Russian economic development is inextricably intertwined

with cooperation in the West. There is a multiplicity of political

forces at play ranging from the most irresponsible of the

unreformed Communists, Zhirinovsky, to truly Western-oriented

bona fide democrats, with a small ‘‘D.’’

If you agree with this small framework, I would be grateful if

you would share with us—and I know this has to be very preliminary—

your appraisal of the change in prime minister ship that occurred

today, the likely role former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin

will continue to play with respect to the Kosovo crisis. Since Secretary

Talbott is in Moscow as we speak, and you certainly are in

close touch with him, what is Strobe Talbott’s message to Yeltsin

and the Russian leadership at this critical juncture?